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INTRODUCTION
Christopher St. German (ca. 1460-1540) has been described as
the author of "the first critical discussion of the common law of any
substance to be published."' That is saying a great deal. So favorable
an estimate must take it as a given that Bracton and Fortescue and
Littleton were not critical enough of the common law to count. How-
ever, the description cannot possibly have meant 'critical' in the ordi-
nary sense, as in the way that, say, Jeremy Bentham was critical of the
common law. Bentham pointed to the many imperfections he saw in
the common law and proposed schemes for their reform. St. German,
by contrast, was no detractor of English law's merits. The description
must instead have meant 'critical' in the sense of standing somewhat
outside the common law and examining its meanings and its worth. In
that sense of the word, St. German may have some claim to the title
"first critic." He did purport to examine English law from outside. He
did not merely extol its excellence or state its rules. And even if one
concludes that he does not take the palm among impartial observers,
his work deserves the attention of all students of the history of Eng-
lish common law-not least because he wrote on the dawn of devel-
opment of the law from its medieval form to the form that emerged
from its renaissance during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centu-
ries.3
The book upon which St. German's reputation chiefly rests is
known as Doctor and Student, although it was by no means his only
learned work. Its main part appeared in 1528, and additions to it were
t Ruth Wyatt Rosenson Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago Law
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1 Eric W. Ives, St. German, Christopher, in A.W.B. Simpson, ed, Biographical Dictionary of
the Common Law 458 (Butterworths 1984) (short biographical sketch).
2 Herbert L.A. Hart, Bentham, Jeremy, in Simpson, ed, Biographical Dictionary 44 (cited
in note 1) (short biographical sketch) ("Bentham became, in John Stuart Mill's phrase, 'the
greatest questioner of all things established' but his criticism never merely destructive, was ac-
companied by detailed plans for the reform of any branch of the law.").
3 See generally J.H. Baker, The Dark Age of English Legal History, 1500-1700, in Dafydd
Jenkins, ed, Legal History Studies 1972 1 (Wales 1975) (describing legal thought in this era);
Samuel E. Thorne, Tudor Social Transformation and Legal Change, 26 NYU L Rev 10, 10-11
(1951) (describing the transition from the medieval to the modem world).
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made in 1530 and 1531. The whole has been many times republished,
most recently and definitively in 1974 by the Selden Society.4 About
the author we know less than we would like. He has remained a rather
shadowy personality. We know he was a member of the Middle Tem-
ple, and that he gained a reputation among his contemporaries for
uncommon learning in the Roman and canon laws as well as for his
expertise in English common law. Bale described him as a man of
quite extraordinary probity and piety-indeed Bale thought it not
right to say his name without a certain reverence By common
agreement, St. German was a man of good judgment in worldly mat-
ters. However, it was as a scholar, rather than as a man of the world,
that he. has become best known. Scholarship suited him.
Doctor and Student was written in the familiar if artificial form of
a dialogue. On one side stood the Student of the English common law;
on the other a Doctor of Theology. The ostensible occasion for their
dialogue was the Doctor's desire to know more about the law of Eng-
land-the common law. He had found so much of it written in French
(he said) that he required the aid of an expert guide, and on that ac-
count he sought out his friend, the Student, who it turned out was
quite willing to provide his aid. They proceeded to exchange informa-
tion. The Doctor was not a mere interlocutor; he had learned some-
thing about English law, and he added what he knew from the ius
commune. Sometimes he knew quite a bit of both. But the English
common law held center stage throughout, and the Student was the
principal informant.
What was the principal purpose of writing Doctor and Student?
The answer to the question is not obvious. Legal historians have
found it difficult to give a straightforward account of St. German's
aims. Indeed they have discovered several purposes. First, St. German
managed to convey a great deal of substantive law in the pages of his
dialogue, and it was as a repository of learning that the work was most
often used by lawyers in the centuries immediately after its publica-
tion. "Dr. & St." was a common citation in the English reports of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.! Second, the work anticipated the
theme to which St. German would turn more aggressively in his later
works: the conflict between the common law and the law of the
church. On matters like tithes and the powers of Parliament, St. Ger-
4 T.ET. Plucknett and J.L. Barton, eds, St. German's Doctor and Student (Selden Society
1974) ("Doctor and Student") (printed with the Latin version on one page and the English ver-
sion on the facing page).
5 See John Bale, Index Britanniae Scriptorum 53-54 (Oxford 1902) (R.L. Poole, ed)
6 See, for example, Manby v Scott, 1 Mod 124, 126, 86 Eng Rep 781, 783 (Ex Ch 1663);
Haughton v Wilson, 3 Keble 203,204,84 Eng Rep 677 (KB 1673); Green v Wilcoks, Cro Eliz 462,
78 Eng Rep 700 (KB 1596).
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man upheld the side of the temporal law. Thomas More became his
great opponent, and a natural one, for More was a clerically-minded
layman-St. German was not. Third, the treatise explored the role of
conscience and equity in law, both in the court of Chancery and the
common law itself.8 To this discussion the Doctor added his own per-
spective, much of it taken from the ius commune. Finding a neutral
place for equitable principles in the common law of contracts was a
continuing (and difficult) preoccupation of the author.
It is true that these three purposes do appear, and even stand out,
in Doctor and Student. It is no desire of mine to criticize or detract
from their significance in understanding the work. It is my desire,
however, to add a word about a fourth subject that has not been dealt
with much in studies of St. German: the place of the law of custom in
his work. This issue has received little scholarly attention. Perhaps
custom's virtual eclipse as an independent source of law in our own
day9 has kept us from recognizing just how prominent it was in the le-
gal world of the sixteenth century and in the mind of St. German him-
self. But whatever the source of neglect, it is a subject that deserves
attention if we are to make progress in understanding the nature of
Doctor and Student and the contribution its author made to the for-
mulation of the common law.
I. THE LAW OF CUSTOM
To appreciate the place of the law of custom in Doctor and Stu-
dent requires starting with the medieval ius commune, the amalgam of
Roman and canon law that long furnished the starting point for
European legal education and for practice in the courts of the English
church. The ius commune treated custom as a legitimate source of law.
"Custom of long standing is rightly regarded as law," proclaimed a
text in the Digest.'° "The usages of the people of God are to be taken
as law in those matters where the sacred Scripture has established no
certain rule," stated the Decretum Gratiani (ca. 1140), the first and ba-
7 He is described as a "publicist for Henry VIII's legal reformation of the English church"
in Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, Theology of Law and Authority in the English Reformation 68
(Scholars 1991) (noting that his later work adopted the "more blatantly secularist program" of
transferring the power of the clergy to the King).
8 See, for example, the treatment in W.S. Holdsworth, Sources and Literature of English
Law 185-87 (Clarendon 1925) (noting that St. German pointed out parts of English law that
"needed the help of equity").
9 See, for example, United States v Rizzinelli, 182 F 675, 682 (D Idaho 1910) (finding an
argument that custom supported the building of nonmining structures on mineral-rich land
"without significance" in determining the validity of a regulation concerning such structures).
10 1 The Digest of Justinian 13 (Pennsylvania 1985) (Theodor Mommsen, Paul Krueger,
and Alan Watson, eds) (translation of Digestum Justiniani 1.3.32).
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sic text of the medieval canon law." Custom was not simply a "back-
ground norm." For many purposes it was treated as binding law. How-
ever, it was also recognized that custom could be a source of harm to
important social interests. An evil way of doing things was no less evil
for having lasted a long time, and the ius commune treated it as a cor-
ruption of the law, not a legitimate source of law.'2
How did one tell the difference? The subject admitted of dis-
agreement about details among the commentators, but in general it is
fair to describe the communis opinio as holding that before a custom
could claim to be a source of law, it had first to be subjected to several
tests. First, a custom had to satisfy requirements taken from the law of
prescription; it had to be lengthy, open, and uninterrupted. Second, it
must have been accepted by the community governed by it, and that
community had to be of a sufficient size to sustain the observance.
Third, a valid custom had to be consistent with both divine and natu-
ral law. And fourth, it was required to pass a test of reasonability.
Today, it may be thought that these requirements are question-
begging. What is meant by reasonability? How is one to know if the
community accepts a custom? How large must the community be in
any specific case? These inevitably require a policy choice made by a
judge. But at the time St. German wrote, these tests were accepted as
workable by the great majority of jurists. They often left room for ar-
gument in particular cases, but that much can be said of some legal
standards in any age, and no one supposes they can be discarded sim-
ply because they cause uncertainty in outcomes.
The heart of the law thus involved first, establishing the existence
of such a general usage as would satisfy the requirements of prescrip-
tion and then, determining whether it also met more general require-
ments of reasonability and consistency with natural law-
requirements drawn from outside the positive law. One had to know
what the purpose of a custom was and what its likely result would be,
as well as determine whether it had been used for long enough by a
large enough group. That was one of the merits of the jurists' ap-
proach: It clarified the workings of any custom and it tested them
11 Decretum Gratiani, Distinctio 11, canon 7.
12 See generally Udo Wolter, Die consuetudo im kanonischen Recht bis zum Ende des 13.
Jahrhunderts, in Gerhard Dilcher, et al, Gewohnheitsrecht und Rechtsgewohnheiten im Mittelal-
ter, 87, 104-14 (Duncker & Humblot 1992); Peter Landau, Die Theorie des Gewohnheitsrechts
im katholischen und evangelischen Kirchenrecht des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, 77 Zeitschrift der
Savigny-Stiftung ffir Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung 156, 158-68 (1991); John P
McIntyre, Customary Law in the Corpus iuris canonici (Mellen Research 1990); Andrd Gouron,
Coutume contre loi chez les premiers Glossateurs, in Andr6 Gouron and Albert Rigaudiere, eds,
Renaissance du pouvoir legislatif et genese de l'Ptat 117 (Montpellier 1988); John Gilissen, La
Coutume 24-33 (Brepols 1982); Ren6 Wehrld, De la coutume dans le droit canonique 110-97
(Recueil Sirey 1928).
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against standards of reasonability. Indeed the method was not wholly
different from what happens with judicial review of statutes in
American courts.
It is particularly noteworthy that in the ius commune a custom
could validly derogate from written law as well as supplement it. A
community could establish a custom contra legem. This custom could
thus contradict enactments in the positive law, typically those con-
tained in the legislative commands of pope or emperor, as long as the
custom met the tests just outlined." This was to become a controver-
sial area of the law, and attempts were made to bring custom within
the principles of sovereignty by supposing that law-givers had tacitly
authorized customs they had not expressly reproved. Such attempts
would lead ultimately to Austin's supposition that customs became
binding law only when they were recognized as such by the sover-
eign.4 But this was a development in its infancy at the time St. Ger-
man wrote." He took note that Parliament could change a rule of cus-
tom,' 6 but the doctrine that custom must have the approval, even the
tacit approval, of Parliament was not part of his approach to the law.
II. CUSTOM IN DOCTOR AND STUDENT
It is the thesis of this Essay that the law of custom just outlined
played a significant role in Doctor and Student, and that this role
helps us to understand St. German's purpose in writing the treatise."
Two initial points should be made. First, St. German knew something
about the ius commune-perhaps not a great deal, but something! He
cited the Summa Angelica, written by Angelo Carleto de Clavasio (d.
1495) and the Summa Rosella, written by Baptista de Salis (or
Trovamala) (d. ca. 1494) with some frequency." These summae were
alphabetically arranged guides to the law; they gave the general rules
without the complex wrangling of the jurists and were not hard to use.
He also cited a few of the great names in the field, notably Raymond
13 See glossa ordinaria ad X 1.4.11 s.v. rationabilis and legitime sit praescripta; glossa ordi-
naria ad Cod. 8.52(53).2 s.v. aut legem for the medieval understanding of the subject.
14 See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Lecture 1 30-32 (Noonday
1954) ("[B]efore [a custom] is adopted by the courts, and clothed with the legal sanction, it is
merely a rule of positive morality.").
15 See Wehrl6, De la coutume at 273 (cited in note 12).
16 See Plucknett and Barton, eds, Doctor and Student at 48-49 (cited in note 4) ("There
are ... customs of the realm of England which have the force of law, and cannot be changed
without parliament.").
17 There is an instructive parallel with St. German's use of the canon law to justify the eq-
uitable jurisdiction of the Chancellor. See Mark Beilby, The Profits of Expertise: The Rise of the
Civil Lawyers and Chancery Equity, in Michael Hicks, ed, Profit, Piety and the Professions in
Later Medieval England 72,74 (Alan Sutton 1990).
18 See Index under "Summa Angelica" and "Summa Rosella" in Plucknett and Barton,
eds, Doctor and Student at 346 (cited in note 4) (listing numerous cites to each).
20031
The University of Chicago Law Review
of Pefiafort (d. 1275), the compiler of the Gregorian Decretals; Baldus
de Ubaldis (d. 1400), the famous commentator on civil, canon, and
feudal law; and Panormitanus (d. 1463), the greatest of the fifteenth-
century canonists." He cannot have been truly familiar with their
works, however. He cited each of these three men only once, and it is
possible that he knew them only second hand, as by seeing them cited
in one of the summae. St. German also cited, and more than once, the
opinions of Jean Gerson (d. 1429), the famous Chancellor of the Uni-
versity of Paris, moral theologian, and knowledgeable critic of aspects
of the medieval canon law. He undoubtedly knew Gerson's works at
first hand. But again, it was not the kind of knowledge acquired by an
expert.
Second, custom as a source of law is one of the most often men-
tioned subjects in Doctor and Student. It recurs constantly. Custom
was, for example, the third ground of the laws of England (the first
two being the law of reason and the law of God)." What St. German
described as "general customs of old time used throughout all the
realm, which have been accepted and approved by [the English Kings]
and all their subjects" were for him an immediate source of English
law.Y This was not an original idea, of course, among English lawyers.
The medieval treatises known as Glanvill and Bracton had so charac-
terized the English law in their descriptions and in their own titles."
However, St. German returned to the theme of custom's place in Eng-
lish law again and again-so much so, that it was clearly more than
one possible source of that law for him. It was, for example, "by the
old custom of the realm" 24 that eldest sons inherited to the exclusion
of their younger siblings, that lords of land held by knight service had
the right of wardship over the children of their tenants, and that livery
of seisin was necessary to validate a feoffment of land. If a statute
stated a rule, normally St. German described it as 'confirming' a rule
19 See id at 310 (reference to "Raymond"); id at 119 (citing Panormitanus); id at 321 (cit-
ing "Baldus de Perusio"). For a brief introduction to work of Raymond of Pefiafort, see James
A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law 222-23 (Longman 1995) (biographical sketch). For Baldus
de Ubaldis, see id at 207 (biographical sketch). For Panormitanus, see J.A. Clarence Smith, Me-
dieval Law Teachers and Writers: Civilian and Canonist 94 (Ottawa 1975) (biographical sketch).
20 See Index under "Gerson, John" in Plucknett and Barton, eds, Doctor and Student at
344 (cited in note 4).
21 See Plucknett and Barton, eds, Doctor and Student at 45 ("The third ground of the law
of England stands upon diverse general customs.") (spelling modernized).
22 Id (spelling modernized).
23 See Bracton De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (Bracton on the Laws and Customs
of England) (Harvard 1968) (George Woodbine, ed, and S.E. Thorne, trans); The Treatise on the
Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly Called Glanvill (Nelson 1965) (G.D.G.
Hall, trans).
24 Plucknett and Barton, eds, Doctor and Student at 46-47 (cited in note 4) (spelling mod-
ernized).
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based on custom. He drew the same distinction between local cus-
toms and general customs that appeared in the ius commune." In sum,
custom was a consistent theme.
III. COMMON LAW RULES UNDER SCRUTINY
His invocation of custom had a purpose beyond simple descrip-
tion. St. German turned to the law of custom as it had been developed
in the ius commune in order to explain and to justify the English
common law.27 After the general introduction, Doctor and Student
took up individual rules of the common law and submitted them to
analysis. He largely used the same test as the ius commune. As the
Doctor said, a law based on custom was the surest kind of law, but
only if the custom in question did not contradict "the law of God" or
"the law of reason."" It was St. German's design to examine English
rules of law and then to demonstrate that, once their purposes were
fully understood, they passed that test. It was this method that al-
lowed him to make a "critical" examination of its tenets. It enabled
him to examine the justification for some rules that then looked (and
some still look) suspect at the outset. Here are three examples.
A. The Law of Tithes
St. German examined some of the disputed issues of his own day.
Among them, the law of tithes, and the place of custom within it, oc-
cupied a particularly contentious place. It was agreed by all that "the
tenth part of the increase, yearly arising and renewing from the profits
of lands, the stock upon lands, and the personal industry of the inhabi-
tants" was owed to the church." It was also agreed that customary
methods of paying tithes were perfectly lawful; for example, tithes of
grain or animals might lawfully be commuted to money payments.
Parsons preferred to have an equivalent sum of money in place of a
pig or a sheaf of wheat. The contention between clergy and laity (and
between canon law and common law) came in deciding what scope to
25 See, for example, Statute of Marlborough, 52 Hen III (1267), in 1 Statutes of the Realm
(William S. Hein 1993) (providing that individuals shall receive justice in the King's Courts, and
thus prohibiting individuals from seeking unlawful revenge or distress), mentioned in Plucknett
and Barton, eds, Doctor and Student at 48-49 (cited in note 4) (stating that "this custom is con-
firmed by the statute of Marlborough") (spelling modernized).
26 See Plucknett and Barton, eds, Doctor and Student at 46-47 (cited in note 4) (stating
that the general customs of the realm are the ground of different courts in the realm); id at 70-
71 (noting that there are different customs in different areas). This had the consequence that the
judges determined general customs, whereas local customs had to be found by verdict of a jury.
27 See id at 74-75 ("quod lex illa nichil vult contra rationem nec contra legem dei").
28 Id at 56-57 (spelling modernized).
29 William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England 24 (Chicago 1979). For
the canon law, compare Hostiensis, Summa aurea, Bk IV, tit De decimis, no 1.
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give these customs. A custom to pay no tithes whatsoever was invalid,
but what about a custom not to pay full tithes on particular items?
St. German discussed this question in the context of tithes on so-
called "great wood," that is trees of over twenty-years growth. When
one of them was cut down, did the person whose wood it was owe a
tenth of its value? English custom, backed in this case by a statute en-
acted in the fourteenth century, said no)4 The canon law said yes.3 At
no point in his discussion did St. German address the question simply
by pitting the relative powers of church and state against each other.32
There was no test of brute strength. Instead he asked whether the cus-
tom was valid under the ius commune itself. He did not slavishly fol-
low the canonists, most of whom would have held the custom invalid,
but he made use of their methods.
First, he looked at biblical texts, which showed the diversity of
ways in which tithes had been paid in past ages. Thus, the law could
not require an automatic answer. Second, he noted that the purpose
of the tithe-to provide a sufficient maintenance to the clergy-could
be met perfectly well without this particular form. Tithing should be
considered in light of its purpose. Third, he attempted to show the ab-
surdity to which the canonists' position might lead. They claimed a
tenth of the yearly increase was owed under the canon law. But if one
took that argument seriously, every tree would have to be cut down
every year. The law should not reach such results. His conclusion was
that this English custom must be valid. No tithe was owed on "great
wood."
B. The Right to Notice of Process
St. German did not shrink from taking on hard cases. The Doctor
asked whether it was true that the King took the goods of men who
had been outlawed after failing to appear in a lawsuit, even though
they had been unaware of the process against them." The Student an-
swered that it was. It was "an old custum" in the law. But was it a valid
custom? The defendant's right to a legitimate citation was an impor-
tant right under the ius commune)4 Even Adam had been given that
right after having eaten the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden
(Genesis 3:9). The right to be summoned before being judged was re-
30 See 45 Edw III, ch 3 (1370-71), in 1 Statutes of the Realm (cited in note 25).
31 See William Lyndwood, Provinciale (seu Constitutiones Angliae) 190-91 (1679), for the
contemporary understanding from the canonical point of view.
32 See Plucknett and Barton, eds, Doctor and Student at 300-14 (cited in note 4).
33 Id at 181-84.
34 See, for example, Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights
Tradition:An Historical Inquiry, 33 BC L Rev 37, 64-65 (1991) (arguing that thirteenth-century
canon law contained the concept of a right, liberty, or privilege).
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garded as a part of natural justice, and it seemed, therefore, that this
English custom would not pass muster.35
St. German nevertheless found the custom valid. It has been used
"time out of mind," and the King, as the font of justice, was obliged to
make writs available to his subjects whether their complaints were
true or false. The purpose of this custom was to guarantee that there
would be due administration of justice according to that oath, for if
the King could not offer strong sanctions, he would not be true to his
oath and his responsibility to do justice. Moreover, St. German added,
all property had been granted to men by positive law, not by natural
law. By the natural law all property was held in common. Hence, posi-
tive law could set reasonable conditions on the grant of property. In-
deed there are many such limitations-for example, laws barring
claims to property after the passage of a certain period of time. This
was a perfectly permissible encroachment on property rights, one rec-
ognized by all the jurists. In addition, the English law sets up numer-
ous stages in any lawsuit before property could be forfeit to the
Crown for a defendant's non-appearance; there must first be attach-
ment, capias, alias, pluries, and a summons in exigeant. Fully consid-
ered, the Student concluded, the custom could not be said to be con-
trary to either reason or the law of God. Everything the "policy of
man could reasonably devise to make the party have knowledge of
the suit" was done in the English law. Indeed, if the worst happened,
the person whose property was taken might have a remedy against
the person who caused him to be summoned without good cause into
the royal courts.
C. The Practice of "Giving Color" to a Claim
Some of the customs St. German examined and discussed were
quite technical. For instance, in assizes of novel disseisin-actions
brought to recover possession of land-it became customary during
the fourteenth century for defendants to "give color" to the plaintiff's
claim. 7 It was a way of keeping a legal issue out of the hands of a jury
and submitting it to the judges instead. But it required making use of
a fiction. When a tenant (defendant) was sued by a stranger to recover
land that was in his possession, instead of pleading what amounted to
35 See Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in
the Western Legal Tradition 142-43,161-64 (California 1993).
36 Plucknett and Barton, eds, Doctor and Student at 183 (cited in note 4) (spelling modern-
ized).
37 See generally Donald W. Sutherland, Legal Reasoning in the Fourteenth Century: The
Invention of "Color" in Pleading, in Morris S. Arnold, et al, eds, On the Laws and Customs of
England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E. Thorne 182-94 (North Carolina 1981) (describing the
requirement of color in pleading).
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the general issue ("no wrong and no disseisin"), he would plead that
the plaintiff had himself received a deed of the same land from the
tenant's grantor prior to the time the defendant entered by deed and
livery of seisin. In other words, the plea raised a legal issue: whether
an earlier deed without livery prevailed over a later deed with livery.
For that reason, the judges would be competent to determine the out-
come." However, the prior deed was pure invention. It only gave
"color" to the plaintiff's title. As St. German himself noted, "[T]he
truth be that there were no such deed of feoffment made to the plain-
tiff as the tenant pleadeth."39
The question was whether this form of pleading, treated as a cus-
tom of English law by St. German, was a legitimate one. It was a lie.
On hearing it so described, the Doctor distinguished between men-
dacium perniciosum and mendacium officiosum, but his initial view
was that whichever of the two it was, the custom was a sin and to be
avoided." However, the student answered, taking a page from the
Doctor's own book, by recalling the lie told by the Hebrew midwives
to Pharaoh in order to save the male children of the Israelites (Exo-
dus 1:18-20). God had approved that lie. Its purpose was meritorious
and its outcome was a praiseworthy increase of the nation of Israel.
Moreover, this custom avoided the possibility of a greater peril, that
of perjury among the jurors. It was common ground that jurors were
not experts in the law. If forced to give a general verdict, they might
decide wrongly. If they did, they might be erring out of ignorance, but
this would not altogether excuse them. They would have been false to
the oath they had taken nonetheless. Thus the legal fiction by which
decision was given to the judges, although false, was consistent with
both divine law and reason. And that was the real test.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE METHOD
These three examples show how St. German approached the
common law. It was very like the method developed in the ius com-
mune. However, the parallel could not have been exact-and it was
not. This is true because within the continental traditions, particular
customs were tested against the laws found in the Corpus iuris civilis
and the Corpus iuris canonici, the basic sources of the ius commune.
The question would be whether custom could lawfully prevail against
the texts and what was stated in them. In England, by contrast, there
was no Corpus of the law to be contrasted with custom. The common
38 See EW. Maitland, The Beatitude of Seisin 11, 4 L Q Rev 286, 295 (1888) (noting that
courts limited juries to matters of "only the purest fact").
39 Plucknett and Barton, eds, Doctor and Student at 294-95 (cited in note 4).
40 Idat295.
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law was custom. It was all that existed. Only when particular customs
could be set against national custom could the method used by the ci-
vilian commentators be adopted with more exact fidelity. Of course,
this happened. Borough customs, the customs of merchants, and eccle-
siastical customs would be "tested" against the rules of the common
law.' The tests turned out to be the same as those used by St. German.
In one sense, then, what St. German did was only half of what the
continental jurists did; he used the concepts of rationality, natural law,
and divine law to test the validity of English customary law, but he did
not have the alternative-the texts of the Roman and canon laws-to
fall back on if the English custom proved to be illegitimate. Luckily (it
seems) St. German found few flaws in the English rules he examined
under the lens of the academic law of custom. This was in fact a quite
common situation wherever English common lawyers sought to make
use of the resources of the ius commune. The fit was not perfect.
There would have to be some pushing and pulling-some serious ef-
forts at adjustment-if intelligent use were to be made of what one
learned from the Continental sources. From Bracton to Coggs v Ber-
nard," loose ends would always appear.
However, those loose ends should not cause historians to close
their eyes to the attempts of lawyers like St. German to make produc-
tive use of "alien" legal habits. A modern observer once suggested
that in Doctor and Student, "legal rules are put in the witness-box and
cross-examined to credit." 3 True enough in a sense. What this ob-
server said vindicates the view of St. German's preeminence as an
early critic of the common law. At the same time, the modern ob-
server's statement misses the vantage point from which St. German
"cross-examined" the legal rules. That was a vantage point adapted
from the law of custom derived ultimately from the ius commune.
41 See, for example, Carleton K. Allen, Law in the Making 123-44 (Oxford 5th ed 1951)
(discussing the application of custom).
42 2 Ld Raym 909,914-15,92 Eng Rep 107,110-11 (KB 1703).
43 Percy H. Winfield, The Chief Sources of English Legal History 322 (Harvard 1925) (de-
scribing St. German's work).
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